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Abstract
I run a series of laboratory experiments to estimate and describe the extent to which an
individual's charitable donation to one cause displaces his or her giving to another cause.
The experiments also investigate motivations for giving, including the simple warm-glow
and public-goods models, and the desire for inuence, reputation, and normalizing behavior.
In the rst wave of experiments I allow 49 subjects to donate or keep any amount of their
$10 "endowment" to any of three charities in each of six stages (with one stage randomly
chosen for payments). Some of the stages include "shocks" (to certain charities), such as an
expanded choice set, a higher "match" rate, and a promotional video. The second wave of
experiments (48 subjects) has 13 stages, a larger set of treatments, and a $20 endowment.
All of the treatments have the hypothesized effect on giving, including the "price" shock;
in contrast to previous experiments, the subjects exhibit price-elastic demand. Subjects
also give signicantly more when their decisions and identity are observed. The results
demonstrate that expenditure substitution among charities can be seen in a laboratory
setting. I nd large own-price elasticities and very large cross-price elasticities  these
charities are gross substitutes in the conventional sense. The substitution is stronger where
the charities serve similar purposes, such as UNICEF and Care. In the reduced form
model, using instrumental variables estimation, I estimate an expenditure substitution
coefcient of 37%  when gifts to one charity are increased (or decreased) by a certain
amount because of a shock, the sum of gifts to other charities decreases by 37% of this
amount. The conditional-on-positive estimate of this substitution is 80%: where gifts to both
charities remain positive, the crowding out is $0.80 for every $1.
1 Introduction and Motivation
In modeling philanthropic giving, economists have typically focused on two major
issues: the crowding out of government grants and the impact of different tax regimes
on overall giving. Little attention has been given to the extent to which an individual's
contribution to one cause comes at the expense of her other philanthropy. This issue has
come to the attention of policy-makers and journalists in the wake of the September 11, 2001
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terrorist attacks,1 and again after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami2 and 2005's Hurricane
Katrina3  in each case there was a concern that the ood of donations to the well-publicized
cause would dampen giving to other charities. However, some have dismissed this concern,
claiming that donor fatigue is a myth.4.
The present paper reports experiments designed to elicit homegrown values
surrounding charitable contributions. More specically, I measure whether and to what
extent an individual's contribution to one cause comes at the expense of his or her
other philanthropy. I rst present this substitution in terms of cross-derivatives and
cross-elasticities, in response to price changes and other specic shocks, and discuss the
ratios of these responses. I next use an instrumental variables approach to directly estimate
expenditure substitution  the change in gift to one charity in response to a specic shock
to another charity. The sign, magnitude, and nature of this effect is of great popular interest
and is crucial to tax and social spending policy, nonprot management, and individual ethical
decision-making (see Reinstein, 2007). It is also important to the economic literature for at
least two reasons. First, it complicates the estimation (and the normative implications) of the
price-elasticity of giving and the crowding out of government spending. Second, knowing
whether expenditure substitution occurs, whether it is complete, and how it depends
on the charities compared can offer evidence against or in support of several proposed
economic models of giving, including the public goods (Becker, 1974), warm-glow
(Andreoni, 1989), tithing, and Kantian (Sugden, 1982) models5.
Because it is difcult to observe exogenous shocks that alter giving to one charity
without any independent effect on giving to other charities, observational (happenstance)
econometric evidence is vulnerable to the criticism that what is being observed is not the
true (expenditure) substitution effect. Most plausible shocks that cause more giving to
one charity will cause more giving to the other charity, masking substitution effects. While
this is less of a problem with an approach that exploits specic shocks (such as a college
reunion year as a shifter of educational giving), such regressions have their own weaknesses,
including high standard errors and the difculty (or impossibility) of demonstrating that
the required exclusion restrictions hold. In contrast, experiments can offer evidence for
substitution patterns that are not vulnerable to endogeneity. In experiments we can also
manipulate the price of giving to one charity independently of the price of other gifts.
However,the laboratory setting raises issues of external validity.
While there has been some laboratory and eld experimentation involving charitable
giving in recent years (e.g., Shang and Croson, 2005; Falk, 2004; Frey and Meier, 2004),
I found none that allowed gifts to multiple charities, and none that examined substitution
1 <http://www.sptimes.com/2002/09/04/911/Sept_11_donations_swa.shtml>
2 <http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/africa/07/30/africa.hungry.ap/index.html>
3 Katrina Giving Cuts Donations To Other Groups; As Relief Contributions Pour In, Unrelated
Charities Retool Plans To Get Back on Donors' Minds  The Wall Street Journal, September 20, 2005.
In response, the government increased the maximum allowable tax deduction for charitable giving to 100 percent
of income on donations made during the last part of 2005.  Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Act...,
by Candace Clark, UNC-Chapel Hill. <http://www.johnbrownlimited.com/newsletter/1005/index.cfm>
4 Many Dismissing `Donor Fatigue' as Myth New York Times, April 30, 2006
5 See Reinstein, 2007 Reinstein (2007a) for a further discussion of these models and their predictions.
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patterns. As in Eckel and Grossman (2003) (henceforth EG), my experiment is essentially a
modied dictator game, in which subjects make a series of allocation decisions dividing
an endowment between themselves and their chosen charities. To estimate the conditional
demand response to a preallocation (i.e., exogenously determined consumption of one
good), the ideal experiment would exogenously shift the amount allocated to one good, and
observe the resulting reallocation of the other choices. However, the consumption value of
charitable giving, including benets such as warm glow and self-signaling (e.g., Benabou
and Tirole, 2003) may depend on the gift being voluntary. Thus, I cannot meaningfully
implement such exogenous shifts. Instead, in a laboratory setting, I generate shocks that
are characterized as specically affecting one type of giving (e.g., a video promoting one
charity) and then observe giving to this charity and to other charities. This allows estimation
that is immune to the potential endogeneity and omitted variable bias of the observational
analysis. On the other hand, experimental evidence is often criticized as lacking external
validity; thus the two types of evidence are complementary. I use three types of treatment: a
limited/expanded choice set, varying prices (match rates), and an informational/emotional
appeal.6 In using these indirect methods  generating a shock and observing the resulting
substitution  I simultaneously test both the effects of these shocks and the substitution
patterns, measuring both the direct impact on the shocked charity the indirect impact on the
non-shocked charities (presumably via substitution)
I ran two distinct waves of experiments, each wave containing three sessions, and using
a total of 97 subjects, mainly U.C. Berkeley undergraduates from a variety of departments,
but also including some staff and alumni. The experiment lasted between (roughly)
30 minutes and one hour for each subject. In the rst [second] wave there are six [13]
decision-making stages for each subject, and the outcome of each stage (a payment to the
subject and/or the charities) is realized with 1/6 [1/13] probability. In what I will refer to
as the baseline stage a subject can donate up to $10 [$20] to one or more of three charities,
and are informed that the experimenters will add an additional 20% match to each of
their gifts. The subjects can keep what they do not donate. The charities, CARE-USA
(henceforth CARE or CR), Medical Research Charities, (henceforth MRC) and
Scholarship America, (henceforth SA) were chosen to mimic the categories basic
needs, health, and educational (respectively) in the PSID data.
In addition to this baseline stage I offer treatments in various stages/waves including
restricting the choice set to one charity, augmenting the choice set to include UNICEF or
The Nature Conservancy (TNC), increasing the match rate to 50% for one charity, and
showing a promotional video for CARE. Nearly all of these shocks had the hypothesized
effect on gifts, including the price shock: in contrast to previous experiments, the subjects
exhibit (locally) price-elastic demand.
While the experiment reveals much heterogeneity in subject's giving behavior, my
results strongly suggest that these charities are substitutes. When a shock causes subjects
6 The rst two of these treatments in effect limit the budget or choice set, as in revealed preference analysis. Stages
9-13 of my `second wave' experiments also involve `social' treatments (observation of other subject's
gifts); I analyze these in a separate paper.
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to increase their giving to one charity they are far more likely to decrease their giving to
the other (unshocked) charities than to increase this giving. In structural regressions I
consistently nd a large own-price elasticity, and large positive and signicant cross-price
effects. In direct 2sls regressions of giving to one charity on giving to another, where the
latter is instrumented by the shocks mentioned above, I nd crowding out at a 37% rate; in
the Tobit version the conditional-on-positive effect is 80%. The crowding out (cross-price
effect) is even stronger for the two charities that have the most similar goals: UNICEF and
Care. This evidence complements the observational results of Reinstein (2007a) .
In section 2 I survey previous experiments examining charitable giving, both in a
laboratory context and in natural settings. I also give a synopsis of the extensive literature
on public goods and dictator experiments. Section 3 discusses a simple model of giving
and the object of my estimation. In section 4 I describe my experiment and my procedures.
Section 5 presents the main results, both on the substitution patterns and on rst-stage
effects, presenting results from a standard structural regression and from reduced form
regressions. In section 6 I discuss internal and external validity, testing for robustness against
alternative hypotheses. I conclude in section 7 by summarizing and interpreting my results
and offering suggestions for future work.
2 Literature Review
EG (1996;1998;2003;2006) conduct several laboratory studies involving actual charitable
giving. I will refer to such experiments (including my own) as out-group since the direct
benets of subjects' contributions will go to non-participants. Their 1996 paper extends
the literature on double-anonymous dictator experiments to argue (in contrast to Hoffman,
Elizabeth, McCabe, Kevin, and Smith, Vernon L., 1996) that altruism motivates behavior.
They compare donations when the counterpart is the typical anonymous student subject to
when the counterpart is an established charity (the American Red Cross), noting a higher
rate of contribution in the latter case. They argue fairness and altruism require context, and
that the previous double-anonymous dictator experiments removed virtually all motivation
for donating... as decision makers do not have enough information to know if their partner
is poor or otherwise deserving. In contrast, EG point out that in the real world most donors,
even those who wish to remain anonymous, know their recipient, or at least the general
characteristic of their recipient, thus opening the door for altruism to play a role.7 EG's
2004 work focuses on whether the framing of a charitable subsidy  as either a matched
contribution or a rebate  determines its impact on giving. Their subjects make 12 allocation
decisions (one of which is randomly chosen for payment), involving different endowments,
different net prices, and with the (equivalent) subsidy expressed in two different ways.
They estimate equation 1 (below) using random effects, Tobit maximum likelihood to
account for the panel nature of the data ... and for the censoring of the subjects choices
from below and above (i.e. ln(0:1) < ln(CONTRIBUTIONS) < ln(maximum possible
7 Such in-group experiments are further muddled (e.g., in Andreoni and Miller's (2002) search for
rational jealousy) by the fact that the subject may have no reason to prefer giving to another
subject over leaving the money for the researchers.
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CONTRIBUTIONS).8 In contrast to the predictions of classical economics, they nd in
every comparable case... the dollar value of the donation is signicantly greater under the
matching subsidy than under the rebate subsidy. They also report evidence consistent with
earlier ndings that women are more altruistic than men, and nd income and price effects
that have signs consistent with traditional economic theory.
ln(contributions)ij = a0 + a1ln(endowment)ij + a2ln(price)ij + a3Xi + "ij (1)
One important nding that their paper overlooks (by focusing on the amounts the charity
receives including the subsidy rather than the amounts donated) is that the amount donated,
the out of pocket expenditure does not increase as the subsidy increases (and the price
decreases). This suggests that the subject either chooses what he or she feels is an optimal
amount of the public good (perhaps in a Kantian model; see Reinstein 2007) or completely
internalizes the subsidy as part of the subject's own warm glow. 9 EG estimate a price
elasticity for match subsidies that is not signicantly different from (but slightly below) one,
when all controls are included. Thus, in the terminology of Andreoni (2006) , elasticity is
below the gold standard, and thus subsidizing giving is ineffective as a policy tool, as well
ineffective as a tool for shocking giving (in terms of the amount an individual gives up) in
a laboratory setting.
Several papers also use eld experiments to examine charitable giving in a natural setting
with quasi-experimental mechanisms that affect contributions. Frey and Meier (2004)
test the effect of a matching mechanism on donations in a controlled eld experiment.
Analyzing the donations of students at the University of Zurich to two funds which
benet other students, they nd whereas a 25% increase of a donation does not increase
the willingness to contribute, a 50% increase does have an effect. Carman, 2003 uses
proprietary records from a large national bank with a workplace giving campaign and nds
that social inuences, particularly among salary and gender groups, play an important role
in determining charitable contributions. Shang and Croson (2005) survey callers to a
public radio station's fund drive, asking these potential donors various questions about their
social network that listens to this station, and measures the impact of this question (and of
the size of the network), on the resulting gift. Other experimental or quasi-experimental
research examines the crowding out effects of public funding (Bolton and Katok, 1998),
the prestige motivation for giving (Harbaugh, 1998), and fund-raising techniques and
psychology/behavior (Weyant, 1996; List and Lucking-Reiley, 2002; Falk, 2004).10
8 They can assume random individual-xed effects because their variables of interest (prices,
endowments, and the framing of subsidies) are chosen randomly and thus should be orthogonal
to any individual-specic components. In my estimation, this assumption is not appropriate, since the variables
of interest (regressors) are a subject's gifts to the other charities in the experiment in a stage 
thus I employ xed-effects and IV techniques, discussed later in the paper. My technique also has
the advantage that within variation generally is less than between variation, leading to more efcient estimation.
9 See, for example, EG, 2003, table 4
10 Richard Katzev (1995) surveys the experimental research into charitable giving across disciplines,
nding 40 studies, mostly from social psychology but also from marketing, communication science,
economics, and sociology. Katzev categorizes these into two groups: Those that examined specic
situational factors that occur in the fundraising setting ... and those that investigated the personal characteristics of the
individuals involved in the exchange...
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3 Model
In this section I offer a framework for understanding the expenditure substitution that
I estimate, and it's relationship to price effects, specic shock effects, and observables.
In doing so, I address the critique that my estimates are incoherent regressions of one
endogenous variable on another.
One big worry, that the massive Sept. 11 donations would hamper other charities,
didn't prove true ... Americans have donated more than $1 billion to the [Katrina/
ooding] relief .... But the largess is starting to come at the expense of charities with
other missions.
The challenge is people like Betty and Larry Sullivan ... They save all the charity
solicitations they receive each year until December, then sort through them and make
their contributions  generally about $30,000, or 10% of their income. ... But already
this year, moved by the plight of the victims, the couple has given $4,000 for the
tsunami relief effort and some $35,000 to help Hurricane Katrina survivors, says
Mrs. Sullivan. They've also been volunteering ... The effort is taxing their nancial
resources .... As for donations to other charities this year, "That's history," says Mrs.
Sullivan... (?)
Economists frame demand (including for purchasing charitable gifts) as a simultaneous
decision to purchase a bundle of goods and services to maximize a utility function subject
to a budget constraint. In this framework, parameters that affect the utility function (e.g.,
good weather) and the budget constraint (income and prices) are said to impact all of the
consumption choices  these exogenous parameters are not seen as specic to any good 
and we estimate (e.g.) own and cross-price derivatives and elasticities, as I do in section
5.3 (also estimating effects of other shocks). To ask how does consumption of A affect
consumption of B? is not meaningful: we cannot assert causality for such simultaneous
decisions, and the ratios of changes in these choices will depend on what is causing the
changes.11 However, as seen in the quotes above, non-economists often pose this question,
frequently make their decisions sequentially, and conceive of one purchase coming at the
expense of another. The above story of the Sullivans suggests that their enthusiastic response
to disaster relief efforts will have a denite negative impact on their usual contributions to
other causes, and that they might not have considered this impact when deciding to give and
volunteer for Katrina and tsunami relief
It is not clear that any such event has a direct impact only on gifts to one cause, and not
other causes  in the standard economic framework this statement is not meaningful. A
shock  can be specic in that it only changes the marginal utility of gifts to one cause, as
in the equation below, but if decisions are simultaneous, the shock will affect all choices.
11 However, even our technical economic terms, although dened in terms of cross-price elasticities,
suggest a more direct causation: coffee substitutes for tea, while cream complements both beverages.
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U = f(x; g1; h(g2; ))
e.g., f(x; g1; g2   ) (2)
Still, if a policy-maker wants to predict the impact of the shock  on gifts to unshocked
charities g1, knowing (or having an estimate of) the effect on g2 may be useful in assessing
the magnitude of the shock. A policy-maker or charity may know there was a tsunami and
also observe measures of disaster giving in response, and may want to predict or infer the
likely impact on another set of charities. Furthermore, under some plausible conditions the
substitution response to any shock will be a predictable function of the direct impact of
the shock (above, on g2).
Assuming that utility is separable in own consumption and charitable gifts, and assume
an additive specic shock ():
U = f(x) + V (g1; g2   ) (3)
And we have the budget constraint:
x+ p1g1 + p2g2  Y (4)
...normalizing the price of own consumption to one.
Under this model, the marginal indirect effect of a shock (@g1@ ) can be expressed
simply as a function of the marginal direct effect of the shock (@g2@ ). Standard comparative
statics of the optimal choices (assuming an interior solution and other standard regularity
conditions) yields the total derivatives:
dx
d
=

Uxx
(5)
dg1
d
=
(p2U12   p1U22)
U212   U11U22
(6)
dg2
d
= 1 +
(p2U11   p1U12)
 U212 + U11U22
(7)
Where: (; p1; p2) is the shadow value of the budget constraint, UIJ  @2U@I@J ,
  @(;p1;p2)@ .
Hence:
dg1
d
= (
dg2
d
  1)p2U12   p1U22
p1U12   p2U11 (8)
The sign of the marginal effect on g1 (relative to the marginal effect on g1) can be either
positive or negative, and will depend on the partial second derivatives of utility and the
relative prices.
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Looking at the discrete effect:
g1(1)  g1(0) =
Z 1
0
[(
dg2
d
(g1;g2)  1)p2U12(g1;g2)  p1U22(g1;g2)
p1U12(g1;g2)  p2U11(g1;g2) ]d (9)
With quadratic utility12, the partial derivatives will be constants, and the discrete indirect
effect, as well as the marginal effect, will be a simple linear function of the direct effect.
g1() = A+Bg2() (10)
Quadratic utility is often justied as a second-order approximation to any other
utility function. With other utility functions the partial derivatives may vary at different
consumption bundles, so the indirect effect may be a nonlinear function of the direct effect,
but these should be solvable (equation 9) for a predictable functional form, which for
estimation purposes, can be approximated to any desired accuracy by a polynomial function.
In section 5.4 I estimate the response of the unshocked charities to the shocks as a function
of the response of the shocked charities.
4 Experimental Design and Procedures
4.1 Design: Wave One
Subjects make decisions in six stages13, and the outcome of each stage (a payment to the
subject and/or the charities) is realized with equal (1/6) probability. This is explained to
subjects in detail, although the precise rules for each stage are not given until the beginning
of that stage. This randomized choice of one stage for payment is standard in economic
experiments, and was used in EG's (2003) charitable giving experiments, among many
others. This setup permits controlled within-subject comparisons, without wealth effects
of early-round earnings affecting late-round behavior (Friedman and Sunder, 1994). Subjects
whose preferences meet standard economic assumptions will treat their decision in one
stage as independent of their decision in another stage: they will simply select the optimal
allocation for each stage, since only one will be realized. At the end of the experiment
the subjects complete a survey (on their demographics, charitable giving behavior, and
perceptions of the experiment), are debriefed on the purpose of the experiment, and are
paid the amount determined by their choice in the randomly chosen stage, in addition to the
initially promised base payment ($5 in the rst two sessions of the experiment and $8 in
the third session).
12 U(x0; x1; :::; xn) = x0 +ni=1ixi   (ni=1ix2i + 2ni6=jijxixj)=2
With i ; i; ij > 0 8 i; j
i.e.,U(Q) = 0Q  1
2
Q0Q
See, e.g., Andreoni and Gale, 1996
13 A formal detailed description of both waves of experiments is given in the appendix.
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1. Table 1: Experiment Design  Wave 1: Endowment $10
Stage 1 2 3 4 5 6
Choice set 1 charity per stage, stratied all 3 charities
Match Rate Base 20% Base 20% 50% for
CARE-
USA 20%
for others
Base 20 %
Other Treatments Promotional
Video
CARE-
USA
In each of the stages, subjects are given an allocation of $10 and the opportunity to
donate (out of their $10 allocation) to one or more of three charities. I attempted to mimic
the charity categories in the PSID data, so that the results can be compared. I chose the
charity CARE-USA (international development and relief) to represent basic needs,
Medical Research Charities (a large pool of research institutions) to represent health
and Scholarship America (college scholarships to underprivileged youths) to represent
education. These donations, not to exceed the pay, are matched at (at least) a baseline
(20%) rate in all cases, to induce subjects to give within the lab rather than wait to decide
later. In addition, in later stages (4-6) I introduce various treatments designed to spur one of
the three causes. To measure underlying individual variation between stages (e.g., fatigue or
learning), I leave some control observations  repeating certain stages for certain subjects.
The treatments are administered in random order where practical (noting, e.g., that to be
isolated news must be in the last stage).
The baseline choice is given in Stage 4  a subject can donate up to $10 to one or
more of three charities, and are informed that the experimenters will add an additional
20% match to each of their gifts. There are three basic kinds of treatments: 1. A
limited/expanded choice set: in stages 1-3 participants could only give to one charity per
stage, while in stages 4-6 they could allocate among all three charities (and their own
consumption) in each stage 2. Price variation: In Stage 5, most subjects were given an
increased (50%) 14 matching rate for gifts to the charity CARE, and the usual 20% matching
rate for gifts to the other charities 3. Information/Propaganda (video shock): In Stage
6 most subjects were required to watch a CARE promotional video. The video is both
informative and persuasive. In the terminology of Friedman and Casar (2004) I employ
a within-subjects design, but with some between-subject variation. While the within
subjects design reduces variance and controls for subjects personal idiosyncrasies, the
between-subject variation (control subjects) and random ordering (for stages 1-3) allow me
to control for time and learning effects.
14 The use of a 50% match is motivated by the ndings of Meier and Frey (2004), as I discuss in section 2.
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2. Table 2: Experiment Design  Wave 2: Endowment $20  First 10 treatments
Stage 1 2 3 4
Choice set 3 charities
Match Rate Base 20% Base 20% for 2, 50% for 1 charity
stratied
Stage 5 6 7 8
Choice set 4 charities TNC and UNICEF 4 charities
stratied UNICEF
Match Rate Base 20%
3. Table 3: Wave 2, Social Treatments
Stage 9 10 11 12 13
Social Treatment Decision anonymously
reported to
randomly-selected
participant.
Standard Decision reported
to subject on your
left
Standard Decision reported
to matched subject
2 to left/right
Standard choice set and match rate: 3 charities (CARE, SA, MRC) with base match rate of 20%. Endowment $20.
Known to be the nal stage
4.2 Design: Wave two
Wave two resembles the rst wave in many ways. Subjects make donation decisions in a
series of stages, one of which is randomly chosen to be realized. As in session one, subjects
receive an automatic base payment ($5) and are given the same endowment in each stage
to divide between themselves, and a (varying) set of charities. Other than involving larger
endowment, the baseline choice, offered in stages one and ve, is the same as in wave one,
involving the same three main charities.
However, there are several important differences. The wave two sessions are longer,
involving 13 stages (plus the survey), and the endowment is doubled (now $20) to make each
decision roughly as salient as in wave one. Stages 2-4 offer a price shock, a higher (again
50%) match rate, but now offered alternately (with the ordering varied) to each of the three
main charities. Stages 6, and 7 expand the choice set to a total of four charities, alternately
(ordering varied) adding UNICEF and The Nature Conservancy. Stage 8 again involves
the three `main' charities and UNICEF, but offers a higher (50%) match rate for gifts to
UNICEF. Stages 9-13 involve various `social' treatments (observation of other subject's
gifts)15
15 To keep the present paper coherent and concise, I focus on the rst eight stages, mentioning
the results from the latter stages only briey, and saving the in-depth analysis of social effects for future work.
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1. Figure 1: Timeline of experiments
4.3 Procedures
My experiment was run using the Experimental Social Science Laboratory (X-Lab) at the
University of California, Berkeley under the X-Lab Master Human Subjects Protocol,16 and
approved by the Committee for Protection of Human Subjects. Subjects were recruited by
the X-Lab (those interested are put on an email list and informed about opportunities to
participate) from a wide pool of students and staff at the University of California, Berkeley.
None of the subjects were allowed to participate in my experiment more than once, although
many had taken part in X-Lab experiments run by other researchers. The experiment
involved 97 subjects in total, recruited by the X-Lab through emails to students and staff
at U.C. Berkeley. The subjects were mainly U.C. Berkeley undergraduates from a variety
of departments, but included some staff and alumni. Emails were sent out to subjects who
voluntarily signed up into a permanent database of potential subjects. In the emails,
subjects were promised an average payment of $15.17 In the third session we made an effort
to recruit staff members, offering a larger ($8) base payment, while in the second wave
(sessions 4-6) the base payments were again $5.
I have completed six sessions of the experiment18, three runs of the rst wave and three
runs of the second. Each session took roughly one hour, plus about 15 minutes to record
payments and print and distribute checks. I show screenshots of selected stages in the
appendix. A complete set of such images, as well as the software code, and the complete
integrated data set of experimental results (including decisions, survey responses, and
response times) are available by request. The video used for the wave one, stage 6 treatment
can be viewed at: <http://www.care.org/videos/picture_a_world.mov.> The rst wave of
experiments used the software Medialab-v419, and the second wave was programmed and
16 <http://xlab.berkeley.edu/cphs/master_protocol.pdf.>
17 The text of the email reads: ...If you are a U.C. Berkeley student or staff member, the X-
Lab is conducting a research experiment and would like your participation. For approximately one
hour, with an additional half hour of administrative time to prepare payments, you will earn an average of $15.
18 Because of a computer failure, the rst session had to be conducted via oral instruction and answers written with
paper and pen, no post-experiment survey data were collected, and assignment of a stage for payment was done by
generating 20 random numbers, one for each subject. The experiment was otherwise identical to
that of the other sessions. The rst run, although conducted under a slightly different apparent conditions (frames),
does not have signicantly different overall levels of giving in the rst 3 stages than the second or third run.
19 Empirisoft, www.empirisoft.com.
11
conducted with the software Z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). After making the choices the
subjects answered a series of survey questions, and were debriefed on the purpose of the
experiment. One of the stages was randomly selected by the computer20 for each subject,
and the amounts the subject chose to contribute and keep in that stage were recorded. After
all subjects were complete, the checks to subjects were printed out and distributed with
roughly a 10-15 minute delay. The subjects were paid the amount they chose to keep in the
randomly chosen stage, plus the initially promised base payment  $5 in sessions 1,2,4,5,
and 6 and $8 in the third session. Within one week of each session, the X-Lab wrote a single
check to each of the charities equal to the amounts promised.
5 Experimental Results
5.1 Aggregate giving patterns21
On average (averaged over subjects as well as stages; see table 4) subjects chose to give
away roughly $3 out of the $10 in the 1st wave and $4 out of the $20 in the second wave,
with 2035% (depending on wave and run) keeping the entire endowment in a typical stage.
These responses resemble those of other studies. For example, EG report a 31% rate of
giving in their 1996 study, with 27.1% of the subjects keeping the full $10, and a (roughly)
50% rate of contribution in their 2003 study.
The six sessions all show evidence of substitution (see gures 2 and 3). The strongest
effect is seen in the fourth stage of the rst wave  when the subjects can allocate up to
$10 (matched at the 20% rate) between the three charities, average giving to each charity is
roughly half as high as in stages where subjects can give to only one charity. This difference
is strongly statistically signicant in all cases, as table 27 shows. This suggests a large
crowding-out: total giving increases by only $0.88 on average when all three charities are
in the choice set (total giving would need to increase by over $4 for no crowding-out). In
contrast, for the second wave, we see little or no crowding out when a fourth charity (UN
or TNC) is introduced to the chance set in the fth and sixth treatment stages. However,
Simonson, Itamar and Tversky, Amos (1992) claim that the attractiveness of an option is
enhanced if it is an intermediate option in the choice set. This suggests that subjects may
have bias towards making an equal division between the options available, and thus apparent
substitution from the choice shock in the rst wave may be an artice.
In the nal three stages of the rst wave both types of shocks to CARE the higher match
rate (50%) and the four minute promotional video  had similar positive effects, increasing
average giving to the shocked charity from $1.29 to $2.23 and $2.33, respectively. Both
the (wave one) price and video treatments are strongly statistically signicant in tests for
differences in the true population mean (table 27 in the appendix). These positive effects
are in spite of an apparent downward trend in giving over time. For the eight control
20 In the rst run, because of computer problems, I used a list of randomly generated numbers,
one for each subject's ID.
21 Descriptions of these and all other variables are given in table 13 in the appendix.
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4. Table 4: Summary statistics of gifts
First Wave Second Wave
Variable Mean Std. Dev. N Mean Std. Dev. N
sa_ 0.81 1.17 195 1.02 1.77 624
Gsa_ 0.49 0.5 195 0.4 0.49 624
mrc_ 0.69 1.02 195 1.16 1.7 624
Gmrc_ 0.46 0.5 195 0.47 0.5 624
cr_ 1.8 2.18 195 1.4 2.19 624
Gcr_ 0.65 0.48 195 0.46 0.5 624
un_ 2.19 2.23 96
Gun_ 0.72 0.45 96
tnc_ 1.31 2.5 48
Gtnc_ 0.52 0.5 48
tot_ 2.9 2.71 294 4.02 4.41 624
Gtot_ 0.74 0.44 294 0.65 0.48 624
gave_ever 0.88 0.33 49 0.9 0.31 48
gave_ever_cr 0.86 0.35 49 0.75 0.44 48
gave_ever_mrc 0.65 0.48 49 0.77 0.42 48
gave_ever_sa 0.69 0.47 49 0.75 0.44 48
VARIABLE NAME DESCRIPTION
X_ Gift to charity X1 in stage2
GX_ Dummy: Gave to X1 in stage2
tot_ Sum of gifts in stage
Gtot_ Gave to some charity in stage
gave_ever Dummy: Subject gave in some stage
Gave_ever_X Dummy: Subject gave to X1 in some stage
1. WhereX 2 fCR;SA;MRC;UN; TNCg
2. Universe: Stages where charity X in choice set
observations in the rst wave, (repeated baseline stages) there was, on average, a decrease
in giving to CARE of $0.44. Although not as dramatic as in the fourth stage, there is a
statistically signicant decrease in mean giving to MRC plus SA in the treated fth and sixth
stages: a drop of roughly 40 cents after either the price or movie shock.
Similar price effects are seen in the second wave. When the match is increased for a
charity (treatment stages 2,3,4, and 8), the average gift to this charity increases, and gifts to
the other charities decline. There is again an overall negative trend in giving over time  this
can be seen by comparing total giving in the baseline stages 1, 5, 9, 10, and 12.22
22 The 10th and 12th stages are arguably not baseline as their may be an inuence of partners'
previous gifts, although I do not nd any such inuence effects.
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2. Figure 2: Aggregate giving patterns, Wave 1
3. Figure 3: Aggregate giving patterns, Wave 2
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5.2 Individual-level Analysis: Substitution
Subjects vary in their response to these shocks, and in their substitution. Table 5 broadly
outlines several important patterns of behavior, and a signicant fraction of subjects fall
into each category (the categories are not necessarily exclusive). 27% of subjects give
infrequently (less than one quarter of the time). Among those who give more than 25% of
the time, I divide those who show a relatively xed purse from those who show a exible
purse, the latter exhibiting more than a 25% standard deviation from period to period in
their giving. I dene a substitution period as one in which the subject gave more to one
charity and less to another than in the previous period. A period is a complement period
if the subject changed their gift to multiple charities in the same direction relative to the
previous stage, but did not change any gifts in the opposite direction. 8% of my sample
gave frequently, to multiple charities, but had no substitution periods. Figures 4 - 7 display
the decisions of four such caricatured types.
5. Table 5: Types of behavior, 2nd wave
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Relatively xed purse (s.d.< 25%), frequent giver 0.33 0.48
Flexible purse, multiple charities, frequent giver 0.31 0.47
Gave < 25% of the time 0.27 0.45
No substitutions, multiple charities, frequent giver 0.13 0.33
Only gave to 1 cause 0.06 0.24
Number of substitution periods 3.5 3.48
Number of complement periods 2.71 2.05
N 48
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4. Figure 4: Giving by subject 613 over stage
5. Figure 5: Giving by subject 502 over stage
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6. Figure 5: Giving by subject 612 over stage
7. Figure 7: Giving by subject 505 over stage
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6. Table 6: Directional changes in giving
Decrease No change Increase Total
Decrease 7 22 126 155
No change 13 117 50 180
Increase 9 12 21 42
Total 29 151 197 377
The qualitative (directional) evidence at the individual level yields a strong result. I
dene a positive treatment to a charity as a higher match rate for that charity (for SA,
MRC,CARE, or UN), a movie having been shown promoting that charity (for CARE),
or simply the charity becoming part of the choice set (for UN and TNC). When my
experimental subjects increase their giving to one charity in periods where this charity (and
only this charity) is given to a positive treatment they generally decrease their total giving to
the other charities and rarely increase it, as seen in table 6.
The magnitude of this substitution is a thornier issue: it may differ across individuals23
and may be nonlinear, i.e., larger or smaller at different levels of initial contribution and
in response to changes of different magnitudes. Furthermore, individuals may not even
have consistent preferences  they may change their substitution patterns over time and
with noneconomic inuences such as EG's (2003) framing of a subsidy. Although the
directional pattern mentioned above is quite strong, there is naturally some heterogeneity,
both in overall giving (as seen in section 5.1) and in substitution patterns.
23 For example,there is evidence (see Reinstein, 2007a), that large givers substitute more than
small givers  which could imply heterogeneity, nonlinearity, or both.
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5.3 Pooled Analysis: `Structural form'
Psuedo-Structural form  specication:
I estimate subject i's gift to charity j in period t as an exponential model, allowing a
charity-specic effect, a time (period) slope, estimation of constant (own and cross) price
elasticities, and proportional effects for each of the shocks:
gjit = e
j  tt 
Y
k=1::K
p
jk
kt 
Y
m=1::M
exp(xjtmjm) Ujt (11)
This is more simply expressed in the similar form:
ln(gjit + 0:1) = j + tt+ 
(p)0
j p
L
jt +
0
jXjt + jt (12)
Where:
pLjt = (ln(p1t); :::; ln(pKt)): Vector of logs of `prices' of gifts to each charity
Xjt = (xjt1;:::; xjtM ):: Vector ofM other variables potentially affecting gifts to charity
j (and other charities)
...Including choice set dummies, `movie' shock, social treatments,
Coefcients of interest: (p)j = (j1:::jk) own and cross-price effects (`elasticities')
Elements ofj = (j1:::jM ): Own and cross effects of choice and movie shocks;
overall effects of social shock
The specication (12) resembles that of several classic papers that focus on the price and
income elasticity of giving, including Taussig (1967), Feldstein and Clotfelter (1976), and
Feldstein, Martin and Taylor, Amy (1976) . However, equation 11, (motivated by Silva and
Tenreyro, 2006)24, estimated using the Poisson pseudo-maximum-likelihood estimator, does
not require a transformation of the left-hand side variable, which is often at a corner (zero
giving). Given the correct functional form specication, standard identication conditions
should hold here: the regressors vary exogenously by design.
24 The exponential model also more robust provides a more robust estimation of elasticities, as
the log-log model only yields useful elasticity estimates under very specic assumptions on the error term.
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7. Table 7: Pseudo-structural regressions
Psuedo-structural, charity level, W2 and W1 stages 4-6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Technique: RE, linear RE, log-linear Xt-Poisson-RE, exponential RE, log-linear Xt-Poisson-RE, exp.
Dependent variable gift_ lgift_ gift_ lgift_ gift_
shocked 0.87***
(0.1)
othershocked -0.31*** -0.27*** -0.30***
(0.07) (0.10) (0.05)
stage -0.047*** -0.051*** -0.040*** -0.060*** -0.040***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.007) (0.02) (0.008)
Dobsdknown 0.30*** 0.41*** 0.24*** 0.50*** 0.25***
(0.1) (0.2) (0.07) (0.2) (0.08)
lprc -4.03*** -2.02*** -3.76*** -1.92***
(0.7) (0.3) (0.7) (0.3)
lprccr_other 1.56** 1.24***
lprcmrc_other 1.64* 1.99***
lprcsa_other 0.87 0.56
un_prcshock 0.0015 -0.069
un_prcshock_onCR 0.50*** 0.25***
un_ch -0.28 -0.32***
un_ch_onCR -0.26 -0.28*
tnc_ch 0.0055 -0.14
Dchar3 -0.29*** -0.18* -0.27*** -0.055 -0.36***
Dchar4 -0.40*** -0.49*** -0.37*** -0.21 -0.19
Constant 1.64*** -2.14*** 0.23 -1.76*** 0.66***
Observations 2313 2313 2313 2313 2313
Number of newid 97 97 97 97 97
rho 0.31 0.47 0.47
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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5.4 Pooled Analysis: Nonstructural Form
As discussed in the introduction, it is useful to estimate the effect of specic shocks to a
charity on gifts to other charities, as a function of the shocks' direct effect. Put another
way, we want to know what change in gifts to B to expect when we see a shocked change
in gifts to A. This estimation could be attempted by regressing one charitable gift on another,
controlling for relevant observables, as implied by the following model:
gjit = [ji] + jit+
0
jig~j;it +
0
jixijt + jit (13)
E(jit) = 0 (14)
If the gifts to other charities were exogenously manipulated25, and not endogenously
chosen, the coefcients  would represent a conditional demand response (see:
Pollak, 1969). In the present case, although the decisions are endogenous, I argue that what
we estimate can be interpreted in as a quadratic approximation of (a multi-charity version
of) the reduced form equation 10.
In addition to the issue of interpretation, there remain econometric identication
problems with estimating an equation such as 5.4 using, say, OLS with a xed effect. in
particular, it is not clear that the identication condition E(jit  ~jit) = 0 8 j; ~j will
hold. In the experimental context, we might argue that period-to-period movements in a
subject's gifts to a particular charity are largely driven by the designed exogenous shocks,
at least after controlling for a time trend. I.e., the controlled treatments pjpk ; :::;k will
shift g~j independently of gjit. However,we cannot rule out the possibility that a subject's
overall generosity may vary in specic periods for other reasons. Furthermore, there is the
possibility of reverse causality, which could bias the estimates.
25 For example, in the case of a typical product, this could be achieved if the government or an experimenter
compelled the purchase and consumption of additional units of this product. For charitable giving, I argue
that enforce donations do not yield the same utility as voluntary ones, and thus such a manipulation is impossible.
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8. Table 8: Instrumented regressions
Instrumented regressions, nonstructural
(1) (2)
COEFFICIENT IV-FE, wave 2 Tobit IV, wave 2
not_ -0.37*** -0.80***
(0.07) (0.3)
stage -0.087*** -0.17***
(0.01) (0.05)
Dobsdknown 0.46*** 1.02**
(0.1) (0.4)
Dchar3 -0.15* -0.12
(0.09) (0.3)
Dchar4 -0.24*** -0.47
(0.09) (0.3)
Constant 2.89*** 3.04***
Observations 1872 1872
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Instruments  1. Price of charities, UN and TNC choice
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These instrumental variable results do not differ signicantly from the conditional
correlation xed-effects regressions reported in appendix table 26, suggesting the bias
from stage to stage variations in latent generosity and other unobservables is minimal. The
Tobit results are much larger in magnitude, because they estimate conditional-on-positive
effects.
6 Robustness Checks
6.1 Internal validity issues
Each stage in the experiment is realized with equal probability, and only one stage is realized.
Thus, the classical expected utility maximizer should treat each stage independently.
However, from a psychological perspective, previous stages may cast a shadow. In
particular,one might worry that offering a higher match rate and then taking it away, as in
wave two stage ve, would discourage later for giving. However, there is no evidence of a
particular discouragement effect in this stage:
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9. Table 9: Test of wave 2 stage 5 difference
Test for discouragement effect, Poisson, Wave 2
(1)
Dependent variable: gift_
Dchar3 -0.29**
(0.1)
Dchar4 -0.15
(0.1)
lprc -2.34***
(0.3)
lprcmrc_other 1.55***
(0.5)
lprcsa_other 0.17
(0.5)
lprccr_other 1.00*
(0.5)
stage -0.044***
(0.009)
stage5 0.030
(0.08)
Dobsdknown 0.37***
(0.07)
Constant 0.43
(0.3)
Observations 1872
Number of newid 48
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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10. Table 10: Results by size of endowment/wave
Test size of endowment X substitution,
(1) (2)
Technique: Poisson, FE OLS-FE
Dependent variable: gift_ gift_
lprc -2.44***
(0.3)
lprc X Wave 1 -0.68
(0.5)
not_ -0.19***
(0.02)
not_ X Wave 1 -0.34***
(0.03)
Dchar3 -0.45***
Dchar4 -0.26**
lprccr_other 0.69*
lprcmrc_other 1.64***
lprcsa_other 0.18
un_ch -0.39***
un_prcshock -0.030
tnc_ch -0.13
stage -0.017** -0.033***
Dobsdknown 0.13*
Constant 0.20 1.99***
Observations 2754 2754
Number of newid 97 97
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
A common criticism of laboratory experiments is that the monetary incentives and
experimental treatments do not dominate the noise, and that the amounts of money at
stake are too small to be taken seriously. In such a case, if we increase the stake enough,
the incentives to maximize should increase, and the subjects decisions should become more
responsive to the treatments. I offer some evidence on this by differentiating the results in
the rst and second waves, noting that the latter had twice the endowment.26
The own price elasticity is (insignicantly) larger in magnitude than in the rst wave,
with the smaller endowment. This suggests that if the (arguably) larger incentives in the
26 The second wave has a larger overall incentive, although admittedly the incentive per stage
is roughly the same. Still, it can be argued that the cost of paying attention to the rules and incentives is largely a xed
cost rather than a per-stage cost, and incurring this cost will yield a greater benet in the second wave.
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8. Figure 8: Response Times
latter wave are salient, the smaller incentives in the former wave are also. As further
evidence that the incentives are salient, I note that most subjects take more than the minimum
time to enter their choices (gure 8)
26
Tables 22 through 24 in the appendix show that the vast majority of the subjects claim
that they understood the experiment and were condent in it's truthfulness. A smaller
majority had condence in the charities themselves.
6.2 External Validity
The issue of external validity is particularly important when we are trying to estimate
homegrown values, such as the nature of the preferences over charitable donations. Friedman
and Sunder (1994) invoke the concept of parallelism to presume that results will carry over
to the real world, and claim that the skeptic has the burden of stating what is different about
the outside world that might change the result observed in the laboratory. Anticipating this,
I address several possible differences.
Harrison (1992) notes that: Lab responses may be censored by eld opportunities. A
subject may under-report her valuation if a good is cheaper in the eld. I address this with
the baseline 20% match rate, which (particularly for those who do not itemize deductions on
their taxes) should make gifts in the laboratory a bargain. If a subject can re-sell a good, she
may over-report her true valuation. In the present experiment, a subject might donate in the
laboratory and in turn reduce her giving in the eld. I differentiate the results in table 11 by
including an interaction term (column 1) and then running a separate regression (column
2), for those who claim to have donated previously, to detect whether such intertemporal
substitution may be occurring.
In the rst column, the interaction term suggests greater responsiveness to price, and
perhaps intertemporal substitution, it is not signicant. The second column's regression
shows similar price effects for the non-outside-givers as for the outside givers suggesting
that intertemporal substitution is not driving my main results.
27
11. Table 11: Outside givers versus rest
Test outside giving X price, Poisson-RE
(1) (2)
Subset Wave 2, CR,MRC,SA ... and did not givers outside
gift_ gift_
Dchar3 -0.29** -0.074
Dchar4 -0.15 0.47**
lprc -1.49*** -1.55***
(0.4)
go_lprc -0.72
(0.5)
lprccr_other 1.46*** 1.16*
lprcmrc_other 2.01*** 2.27***
lprcsa_other 0.62 0.29
un_ch -0.45*** -0.23**
un_prcshock 0.057 0.18
tnc_ch -0.14 0.22*
stage -0.043*** -0.074***
Dobsdknown 0.26*** 0.42***
Constant 0.78*** 0.35
Observations 1872 1131
Number of newid 48 29
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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As the demographics (tables 14 - 21 in the appendix) show, my sample is not
representative of the American population at large, nor of the population of charitable
donors. I employ the typical convenience sample of students (and some university
staff), paid volunteers for such an experiment, young, educated, and living in a liberal
academic setting. While this may not be a problem for testing the theory of universal
behavior, it is well-known that there are wide differences in charitable giving behavior
among socioeconomic groups. While I observe some heterogeneity in substitution patterns,
as reported in section 5.2, there are no clear patterns along observable socioeconomic lines.
Table 12 shows (mean) coefcients that are remarkably similar across the various groups in
my study.27
27 While I test for differences across sex, ethnicity, income, and religion, I do not observe meaningful variation in
categories such as education, region, or age. Future work should expand the sample along these dimensions.
29
12. Table 12: Differentiated results by demographics
Poisson, W2 and W1 (run 2-3) stage 4-6, by demography
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
COEFFICIENT All females only Asians only Income below 63; 000 Identied as a religion
Dchar3 -0.083* -0.24*** 0.11* 0.013 0.024
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Dchar4 -0.19*** -0.60*** -0.17*** -0.30*** -0.18***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
lprc -2.76*** -2.59*** -2.68*** -3.24*** -2.86***
(0.3) (0.3) (0.4) (0.4) (0.4)
othershocked -0.34*** -0.37*** -0.22*** -0.17** -0.35***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
stage -0.042*** -0.050*** -0.035*** -0.025** -0.038***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
movie 0.12 0.13 0.016 0.19 0.048
(0.10) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.2)
Dobsd -0.12 -0.12 -0.20 -0.24 -0.11
(0.09) (0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.1)
Dobsdknown 0.44*** 0.57*** 0.53*** 0.60*** 0.42***
(0.09) (0.1) (0.1) (0.2) (0.1)
Dobsdopsex -0.036 -0.071 -0.11 -0.096 0.049
(0.09) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1) (0.1)
Constant -0.17 0.18 -0.34 -0.78*** -0.15
Observations 2652 1425 1494 1353 1272
Number of newid 97 49 47 43 44
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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7 Conclusion
7.1 Experimental Results and Implications
This series of experiments offer some of the rst evidence on how people give to multiple
charities in the lab. The direct effects of treatments were strong and in the predicted
direction. Most shocks are effective: people give more to a charity when its match rate
was higher, when the decision was observed, when they were motivated by a video, and
when there were fewer other charities in the choice set. Several of these direct effects are
interesting in themselves; as mentioned before, the gifts are own-price elastic with regard to
match rates, contrasting with some previous literature. There is also clear evidence of a
reputation motive: subjects give more when their decision and their identity is observed.
The results conclusively demonstrate that expenditure substitution among charities can
be seen in a laboratory setting. I nd large own-price elasticities and very large cross-price
elasticities  these charities are gross substitutes in the conventional sense. The substitution
is stronger where the charities serve similar purposes, such as UNICEF and Care. In the
reduced form model, using instrumental variables estimation, I estimate an expenditure
substitution coefcient of 37%  when gifts to one charity are increased (or decreased) by a
certain amount because of a shock, the sum of gifts to other charities decreases by 37% of
this amount. The conditional-on-positive estimate of this substitution is 80%: where gifts to
both charities remain positive, the crowding out is $0.80 for every $1. Both the structural
and reduced form estimates obscure a great deal of heterogeneity subjects vary greatly in
their substitution patterns, as seen in section 5.2 and in table26in the appendix.
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8 Appendix
13. Table 13: Variable denitions
Variable name Description
Summary Statistics
X_ Gift to charity X1 in stage2
GX_ Dummy: Gave to X1 in stage2
tot_ Sum of gifts in stage
Gtot_ Gave to some charity in stage
gave_ever Dummy: Subject gave in some stage
Gave_ever_X Dummy: Subject gave to X1 in some stage
Charity Level
gift_ Subject's gift to lhs charity
D_X Dummy: lhs charity is X1
stage Actual stage of experiment (1..13)
not_ Sum of gifts to charities other than lhs charity
shocked lhs charity has shock3
othershocked some rhs charity has shock4
Dobsdknown Decision and subject's identity observed
Dobsdopsex ... by member of opposite sex
lprc log(price of $1 recieved by lhs charity)
lprcX_other log(price of $1 recieved by X1 where lhs charity is not X)
un_prcshock UN 50% match
un_prcshock_onCR UN 50% match and lhs charity is CR
un_ch UN in choice set
un_ch_onCR UN in choice set and lhs charity is CR
tnc_ch TNC in choice set
go_lprc [gave outside of lab] lprc
1. WhereX 2 fCR;SA;MRC;UN; TNCg
2. Universe: Stages where charity X in choice set
3.Shock dened as 50% match
4. ... also UN or TNC in choice set for `othershocked'
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14. Table 14: Sex
Item Number Per cent
Lost Data 5 5
Male 43 44
Female 49 51
Total 97 100
15. Table 15: Race/Ethnicity
Item Number Per cent
African American/Black 3 4
Asian or Pacic Islander 47 60
Don't want to answer 6 8
Hispanic/Latin 8 10
Other/Mixed 6 8
White/Caucasian 8 10
Total 78 100
16. Table 16: Religion
Item Number Per cent
Not collected 19 20
Catholic 15 15
Protestant 7 7
Other Christian 8 8
Other Religion 14 14
No preference/ No religion 28 29
Don't want to answer 6 6
Total 97 100
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17. Table 17: Political afliation
Item Number Per cent
Democrat 34 44
Republican 4 5
Green Party 1 1
Other Party 1 1
No political afliation 34 44
Don't want to answer 4 5
Total 78 100
18. Table 18: Marital status
Item Number Per cent
Single, Never Married 46 82
Married 5 9
Divorced/Separated 4 7
Don't Want to Answer 1 2
Total 56 100
19. Table 19: Number of children (3rd run only)
Item Number Per cent
0 5 63
1 2 25
2 1 13
Total 8 100
20. Table 20: Income or parent's income if dependent
Item Number Per cent
0-10; 000 7 9
10; 000 24,000 12 15
24; 000 41,000 14 18
41; 000 63,000 10 13
63; 000 94,000 8 10
94; 000 130,000 9 12
130; 000 200,000 4 5
More than 200; 000 6 8
Don't want to answer 8 10
Total 78 100
36
21. Table 21: College major
Item Number Per cent
Arts and humanities, psychology, legal studies 8 17
business/ economics/ political science/ public policy 19 40
Physical and life sciences / engineering / math 18 38
Other 1 2
Non-student 2 4
Total 48 100
22. Table 22: Understood rules of experiment
Item Number Per cent
Disagree 5 6.41
Neutral/No opinion/Don't want to answer 4 5.13
Agree 69 88.46
Total 78 100.00
Source: run1_6_data_wide.dta
23. Table 23: Condent we pay the charities
Item Number Per cent
Disagree 2 2.56
Neutral/No opinion/Don't want to answer 6 7.69
Agree 70 89.74
Total 78 100.00
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24. Table 24: Condent in random choice of stage
Item Number Per cent
Disagree 4.00 5.13
Neutral/No opinion/Don't want to answer 9.00 11.54
Agree 65.00 83.33
Total 78.00 100.00
25. Table 25: Condent charities use money as stated
Item Number Per cent
Disagree 23 29.49
Neutral/No opinion/Don't want to answer 5 6.41
Agree 50 64.10
Total 78 100.00
26. Table 26: Descriptive regressions  Overall and by Wave/Run
XTRC, charity level, non-structural
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
COEFFICIENT W1 period 4-5, wave 2 Wave 1 W2 Run 4 R5 R6
not_ -0.32*** -0.47*** -0.21*** -0.25** -0.18 -0.19**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.1) (0.1) (0.07)
Dchar3 -0.18* -0.21** -0.021 0.059 0.13 -0.16
(0.1) (0.09) (0.2) (0.4) (0.2) (0.1)
Dchar4 -0.22* -0.17* -0.11 0.098 -0.090 -0.24*
(0.1) (0.09) (0.2) (0.5) (0.2) (0.1)
stage 0.023 0.27*** -0.052*** -0.022 -0.060** -0.078***
(0.05) (0.06) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Dobsdknown 0.13** 0.32** 0.30 0.39* 0.29
(0.07) (0.1) (0.2) (0.2) (0.3)
Constant 2.41*** 1.41*** 2.56*** 2.88*** 2.26*** 2.51***
(0.4) (0.2) (0.5) (0.8) (0.7) (0.9)
Observations 2313 882 1872 624 624 624
Number of newid 97 49 48 16 16 16
Sigma of Beta_1 0.18 0.12 0.16 0.19 0.23 0.079
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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27. Table 27: Mean Differences in Gifts
Stages: 4 - 1,2,3 5 - 4, treated## 6 - 4, treated## Controls###
CARE -1.39*** 0.94*** 1.22*** -0.44
(.25) (.29) (0.36) .47
SA -1.15*** -0.29*** -0.38*** 0.11
(.21) (.14) (.16) .11
MRC -1.16*** -0.19*** -0.28*** -0.22
(.21) (.10) (.12) (0.28)
MRC+SA N/A -0.48*** -.66** -0.11
N/A (0.21) (0.24) (.31)
Total #0.89*** 0.46*** 0.57** -0.56
(.21) (.23) (.34) (.71)
Obs. 49 29 29 9
Source: X-Lab runs 1,2,3
# Comparing mean giving in stages 1-3 to total giving in stage 4
##For subset: gave to SA or MRC in Stage 4; ...results for all 45 treated observations are similar but smaller in magnitude
###Difference is for controlled stage - 4th stage
39
